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Introduction
Although written fifteen years ago with respect to Canada’s west coast fisheries, the fol-
lowing quote from Pearse (1982) is applicable today for many fisheries world-wide.
We begin with a paradox. We have some of the world’s most valuable fish re-
sources, they are capable of yielding great economic and social benefits; yet many
commercial fishermen and fishing companies are near bankruptcy, sport fishermen
and Indians are preoccupied with declining opportunities to fish, and the fisheries
are a heavy burden on Canadian taxpayers.
Recent fisheries management failures, such as the northern cod fishery on the
east coast of Canada (Gordon and Munro 1996) and the South East Fishery in Aus-
tralia (South East Fishery Adjustment Working Group 1996) highlight the extent to
which many government fisheries management agencies continue to fail to meet al-
most any reasonable set of management objectives.
Not surprisingly, in tandem with the growing list of management failures, there
are numerous suggestions on how to improve management effectiveness, including
the need to introduce comanagement (Jentoft 1989); incorporate risk and uncertainty
in decision making (Hilborn et al. 1993); identify operationally meaningful manage-
ment objectives (Barber and Taylor 1990); allocate strong property rights to re-
source users (Crowley 1996); integrate industry, biological, economic, and social
advice (Lane and Stephenson 1995); move from single stock to ecosystem manage-
ment (Christie 1993); and employ the precautionary approach (FAO 1994).
Our objective is not to comment on proposed solutions to fisheries management
failure. Instead, we contend that the current widespread use of taxpayer-funded pub-
lic sector institutions to deliver fisheries management services limits the likelihood
of successfully implementing any solution. Our opinion is that full cost-recovery of
fisheries management services, by motivating fishers to demand cost effective man-
agement and stronger property rights, represents a powerful stimulus to the evolu-
tion of more effective institutional and operational arrangements. Such arrangements
are likely to feature an increasing provision of fisheries management services by the
private sector.1
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However, the political momentum for implementating cost-recovery of fisheries
management services is unlikely to be generated internally by fisheries authorities.
Fisheries bureaucrats, researchers, and industry have a vested interest in maintaining
the current management framework. Indeed, vigorous opposition to cost-recovery
can be expected from each of these parties, especially the fishing industry, which
will complain often most justifiably, that it is being asked to pay for a bloated bu-
reaucracy which has failed to deliver tangible economic or conservation benefits.
Our opinion is that the pressure to introduce cost-recovery must come from gov-
ernment finance or treasury departments. The need to reduce government budget
deficits or other fiscal imperatives might be expected to provide the motivation for
such action.
The remainder of this article briefly examines a number of issues related to
cost-recovery. We first outline why we think cost-recovery is important to the devel-
opment of effective fisheries management, and we provide some observations on the
effects of cost-recovery in relation to federally managed fisheries in Australia. This
is followed by an overview of how cost-recovery is handled in Australia and
Canada, and some lessons that can be drawn from these experiences. Finally, con-
clusions are presented.
Why Cost-Recovery is Important
In the absence of direct cost-recovery from service recipients, few incentives exist
for fisheries bureaucracies to adopt cost effective approaches to fisheries manage-
ment. As a monopoly provider of services, a fisheries management agency is able to
decide on the type and amount of services provided, subject to the constraints of the
political system within which it exists. The tendency of bureaucracies operating un-
der these conditions to maintain budgets greater than those under competitive condi-
tions is outlined by Tullock (1965) and Niskanen (1971).
As noted in Haynes and Brown (1985), such behavior may be evident in fisher-
ies management agencies which show “a tendency … to undertake activities which
are technically desirable from its point of view but which may be economically un-
justifiable. Such activities may range from collection of information on the pattern and
amount of fishing to a level of surveillance of fishing activities beyond that necessary
for reasonable enforcement of the management regime.” In such cases, benefits will
be appropriated by the administrative authority at the expense of those who pay for
the service—whether they are taxpayers, fishermen or others (Haynes et al. 1986).
Nor is it only managers of the resource who benefit. An authority with mo-
nopoly power will demand more “services” from support organizations operating in
related fields (Tullock 1965; Niskanen 1971). For example, research organizations
can be expected to be called upon for more and more input, with a consequent in-
crease in the size of their budgets.
Introducing cost-recovery from the fishing industry will mitigate these govern-
ment inefficiencies. Being required to pay for a government service which was for-
merly provided “free” normally provokes a number of reactions in the person being
billed: one of which is to take a much greater interest in the quality of the service
supplied. In this sense, fishermen confronted with a bill for fisheries management
services are no different from consumers of nongovernment services. They will de-
mand value for money. They will also want their views on whether services are ap-
propriate and effective taken into account in the government decision making pro-
cess. This is particularly true for fishermen if, as is often the case, industry benefits
from fisheries management services are scarce or not readily identifiable.Thalassorama 59
Implementation Problems
Notwithstanding the potential benefits of cost-recovery, opposition can be expected
from both fisheries bureaucracies and the fishing industry. Fisheries bureaucracies
will normally resist implementing cost-recovery, knowing that the inevitable and
vigorous fishing industry scrutiny of management budgets will lead to greater ac-
countability and a consequent and substantial erosion of management agency discre-
tion in decision making. Trenchant appeals by fisheries bureaucrats to the potential
pitfalls of “client capture” often accompany these more valid concerns.
Also, despite the fact that effective management of any organization requires an
understanding of the costs associated with different activities, it is our experience
that few fisheries management agencies know, in any meaningful detail, the re-
search, enforcement, and other management costs associated with each fishery under
its authority. The introduction of cost-recovery on a fishery-by-fishery basis would
require management institutions to detail these costs. To do so, the agency may have
to totally overhaul its accounting and financial reporting systems, and reorganize its
internal structures to provide an adequate degree of transparency and accountability
to service users. It is little wonder that fisheries management authorities have shown
limited enthusiasm for cost-recovery.
Fishing industry opposition to cost-recovery is also certain for the reasons out-
lined above. This reluctance will be strongly reinforced if the resources being used
by fisheries bureaucracies to address fisheries management problems are revealed as
excessive.
This commonality of self interest between bureaucrats and fishers is likely to
hinder the introduction of a well designed cost-recovery program unless strong pres-
sure is brought to bear from “external” government agencies.
Preliminary Observations on the Effects of Cost-Recovery in Australia
Cost-recovery was first introduced into federally managed fisheries in 1985 in Aus-
tralia by the Australian Fisheries Service, an arm of the Department of Primary In-
dustries. This was in response to a government-wide initiative to introduce user
charges for government services.
The introduction of cost-recovery marked a turning point in Australian federal
fisheries management from which many important developments in fisheries man-
agement institutions and operations can be traced. As might be expected, there was
strong industry opposition to the introduction of cost-recovery, followed by equally
strong dissatisfaction with the subsequent management performance of the Austra-
lian Fisheries Service. This led in 1988 to an independent review of federal fisheries
management arrangements which recommended the replacement of the departmental
structure with a statutory body (Peat et al. 1988). Consistent with this recommenda-
tion, in 1992, a statutory authority, the Australian Fisheries Management Authority
(AFMA), was established to manage federal fisheries.
Immediately prior to the establishment of AFMA, a government inquiry was
held on cost-recovery for fisheries management. In evidence to the inquiry, many
fishermen “criticized the cost-recovery program, saying that they wanted manage-
ment, were prepared to pay for management, but were not getting management. They
complained about inefficiency in the provision of services such as logbook processing,
high costs, and over-servicing. They said that although they had to pay for the ser-
vices, they had little say over the way they were provided and some participants said
that they could arrange to have services like surveillance and logbook collection and
processing provided independently at lower cost” (Industry Commission 1992).Kaufmann and Geen 60
Although it is yet early since the formation of AFMA, several observations can
be made on the effects of cost-recovery. First, an open and transparent budgetary
process has been established in which the fishing industry, through its participation
in fishery Management Advisory Committees (MACs), plays a central role in advis-
ing the AFMA Board on the appropriate types, amounts, and costs of various ser-
vices to be provided. A related observation is that an increasing number of services
are being supplied by the private sector. These include data entry, some quota moni-
toring activities, the administration and chairing of MACs, and research evaluation.
Casual perusal of AFMA’s annual budgets suggest that reductions in expendi-
tures have been achieved, with outlays and staff numbers falling by 7% (in nominal
terms) and 18%, respectively over the 1992–96 period. However, without a detailed
analysis of functions and outlays it is not possible to state categorically that effi-
ciency gains have been achieved.2
Although these observations on the effects of cost-recovery in Australia are gen-
erally supportive of the theoretical arguments in favor of cost-recovery, a central
question, but one which cannot be addressed in this brief article, is whether cost-re-
covery and the resultant changes in institutional structure, have resulted in more ef-
fective fisheries management. It is simply too early to tell. However, it is our opin-
ion that early indicators are positive. In particular, the evolution of management ad-
visory committees in each major fishery (with independent chairpersons, majority
industry membership, and only one management representative), and the growing
involvement of industry in the stock assessment process are reflective of a more
open and transparent decision making process which is starting to deliver desirable
management outcomes.3
For example, a recently completed stock assessment for school sharks
(Galeorhinus galeus) indicated that catches need to be cut in half. Previous assess-
ments also raised concerns with respect to the sustainability of harvest levels; how-
ever in the earlier stock assessment process, industry did not play an active role. In-
dustry argued that these assessments were flawed and did not correlate with their
view of the health of the stock. The current assessment process, in which two of the
industry members of Southern Shark Fishery Management Advisory Committee
(SharkMAC) were heavily involved, has played a significant role in reducing con-
flict and producing an assessment that has been accepted by SharkMAC and the in-
dustry at large—providing AFMA with increased scope to implement industry re-
structuring proposals.
Another observation on AFMA which is indicative of more effective long-term
management, is that the authority is highly focused on the provision to fishers of
stronger access rights. Historically, access rights, of whatever variety (limited li-
censes, gear units, ITQs, etc.) have been usually provided through the medium of
annually renewable fishing permits. These provided fishers with little security of
tenure. Also, substantial changes to permit conditions could be made with minimal
industry consultation.
AFMA has sought to improve the quality of fisher’s rights by improving their
definition through the assignment of ITQs or transferable gear units, and by increas-
ing their security by providing the rights under statutory management plans. The
rights have become “bankable” assets, with third party interests (such as those of
mortgage holders) being recorded in a statutory register. The consultative process
2 It is also worth noting that in a 1996 client satisfaction study undertaken for AFMA by Roy Morgan
Research Centre Pty Limited, 73% of respondents were satisfied or very satisfied with the service pro-
vided by AFMA.
3 See Exel and Kaufmann (in press) for more information on the evolution of institutional arrangements
in Commonwealth fisheries in Australia.Thalassorama 61
required of the authority in order to amend statutory rights is comprehensive. A pro-
posed amendment to AFMA’s legislation (likely to become law later this year) es-
sentially provides for the automatic “roll over” of rights from one management plan
to the next, if, for some reason, a management plan is terminated. As noted in the
introduction, the provision of strong property rights is often held to be a prerequisite
for successful fisheries management.
Different Approaches to Recovering Management Costs
This section provides a brief overview and comparison of cost-recovery regimes in
place in Canada and Australia. Australia and Canada have followed two different ap-
proaches to charging the commercial harvesting sector. Australia has implemented
an explicit cost-recovery policy for all Commonwealth-managed fisheries. The Ca-
nadian system is not formally based on either cost-recovery or rent-recovery, but is
best described as simply a revenue generating initiative. The contrast between the
Canadian and Australian approaches offers important lessons.
Canada
On 18 December 1995, the Minister of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans
(DFO) announced a new license fee schedule for commercial fishing on the Atlantic
and Pacific coasts (Government of Canada 1995). The new fee schedule was fore-
cast to generate an additional $43 million in revenue.
The new fee system distinguishes between two categories of licenses: competi-
tive fisheries and individual quotas/enterprise allocations. In competitive fisheries,
all license holders (in a particular license category) pay a fee based on the average
value of landings of license-holders in that license category. The fee schedule in-
volves a flat fee of $30 or $100, plus increments based on the average landed value
over the 1990–93 period. In quota fisheries, license holders pay a fee equal to 5% of
the average landed price over 1990–93 multiplied by the tonnage of their quota
holdings. For example, a license holder with 500 ton of quota, with an average
landed price per ton of $1,000, would pay $25,000 (5% ×  $1,000 ×  500 t).
It is not correct to describe the Canadian fee initiative as cost-recovery. In fact,
there is no clear rationale underlying the Canadian approach. The Regulatory Impact
Analysis Statement (Department of Fisheries and Oceans 1995) that was required to
implement fee changes, states that two alternatives for calculating fees were consid-
ered: resource rents and cost-recovery. In the Impact Statement, both cost-recovery
and resource rent charges were “ruled out” as possible rationales for calculating in-
creased fees.
Having ruled out cost-recovery or rent-recovery, the Impact Statement then goes
on to argue that, “The introduction of the new license fees involves a partial shift of
the costs of fisheries management from the Canadian taxpayer to the fishing indus-
try.” This statement indicates that the fee increases were in fact a cost-recovery ini-
tiative. However the same Impact Statement also states that, “The new structure of
license fees is based on the principle that it is reasonable to expect that those who
benefit from access to a public resource managed at public expense should pay a fee
that reflects the value (i.e., earning potential) of the privilege.” This suggests that
the new fees were motivated by rent-recovery considerations.
A number of statements in the Impact Statement suggest a less than clear under-
standing of the difference between resource rent and cost-recovery, and this may in
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ery as an approach to revenue generation, the Impact Statement argues that, “many
fisheries management measures which confer benefits to license-holders are essen-
tially costless (e.g., limited entry policies) and fees based on costs would not capture
these benefits.” According to this statement, one of the difficulties with cost-recov-
ery is that it is not effective at extracting resource rent.
The above quote is all the more difficult to understand when viewed through an-
other quote from the Impact Statement, “A pure rental approach was ruled out for
two reasons: first, the lack of exclusive rights in the competitive fisheries generally
leaves fisheries with below normal profits and, hence, no base for levying a royalty
fee …” In other words, the previous paragraph states that cost-recovery is ineffec-
tive in capturing rent in “limited entry fisheries,” while rent-recovery has been ruled
out in these fisheries because there is no rent.
Finally, consider the following quote from the Impact Statement, “ability to pay
is generally weakest in the competitive fisheries which also have the highest man-
agement costs …” To paraphrase the Impact Statement’s argument so far, the prob-
lem with cost-recovery is that it would not capture resource rent in effort-controlled
fisheries that earn “below normal profits,” and that are both costless to manage and
also have the highest management costs.
Essentially, the Canadian approach is aimed at partial cost-recovery of total
management costs across all fisheries, as opposed cost-recovery of management
costs on a fishery-by-fishery basis. Under the Canadian approach some fisheries
could implicitly be paying resource rent (if fees are greater than management costs),
while other fisheries may only be contributing a small portion of their management
cost. Cross-subsidization across fisheries is possible, as is taxation (if fees are
greater than both management costs and resource rent in any particular fishery).
It is unlikely that the Canadian approach of charging an “access fee” based on
the “privilege” of being allowed to fish will result in either increased transparency
or accountability.4 As will be argued later, fisheries management agencies have nei-
ther the expertise nor vested interest in distinguishing between cost-recovery, rent-
recovery and taxation in the aggregate, let alone on a fishery-by-fishery basis. The
pressure must come from the outside, and national finance or treasury departments
have a responsibility and role to play in this regard.
Australia
In Australia, each state or territory manages fisheries resources from the low water
mark to 3 nautical miles offshore, and the Commonwealth government assumes ju-
risdiction from 3 nautical miles offshore to the 200 mile limit of the EEZ. However,
a number of “Offshore Constitutional Settlement” arrangements have been entered
into that allow for the management of specific fisheries by a single jurisdiction. A
number of state governments, including South Australia and Western Australia, have
implemented, or are in the process of implementing, cost-recovery. However, this
section is limited to a discussion of the cost-recovery regime implemented by
AFMA for the federal Australian government.
4 This is not to say that no cost-recovery is preferable to flawed cost-recovery. The Canadian approach
of implementing a charge for the “privilege” of fishing has likely set the stage for confrontation and the
subsequent development of a more appropriate cost-recovery policy at a later point in time. Recent de-
velopments in New Zealand may offer Canadian fisheries managers a glimpse of the future. In New
Zealand, cost-recovery was introduced in 1994–95 following the disbandment of the resource rental
policy. The current cost-recovery system is in a state of flux. In particular, the policy has led to a state
of civil disobedience, with inshore Finfish operators refusing to pay management levies, and with large
corporate operators taking the government to court.Thalassorama 63
One of AFMA’s statutory objectives is to recover the costs of management from
users of its services. A task force was established in 1993 to review cost-recovery in
AFMA managed fisheries. Members of the task force included the Department of Fi-
nance, the Department of Primary Industries and Energy, the Australian Bureau of
Agricultural and Resource Economics, and AFMA. Industry was given observer sta-
tus on the task force.
The task force developed a framework which provided detailed guidance on
which costs are recoverable from the fishing industry and which should be borne by
government. A two-stage procedure was used to assess which group should pay.
Stage one involved the attribution of each of AFMA’s activities to either a specific
user group (commercial fishers, foreign fishers, or recreational fishers) or to the
community at large. In stage two, the following factors were considered in deciding
whether the costs attributable to a particular user group should be recovered: the ex-
tent of user group benefit from the activity, consistency with government cost-re-
covery policy in other sectors, the existence of extenuating socioeconomic consider-
ations, the existence of government policy which impacts on the cost recoverability
for a particular activity, and the cost effectiveness of recovering the costs of any par-
ticular activity (Department of Primary Industries and Energy 1994).
The main outcome of the review was that the costs associated with the manage-
ment of commercial domestic fisheries, with few exceptions, were deemed fully re-
coverable from the fishing industry. Costs associated with the management of col-
lapsed, exploratory, and developmental fisheries may only be partially recovered
while the costs of surveillance and enforcement are split equally between govern-
ment and industry. Around 25% of the costs of fisheries research are paid by the
fishing industry. At present, the costs attributable to noncommercial users, such as
recreational fishers and indigenous fishers, are borne by government. In 1995–96,
the fishing industry paid approximately 75% of AFMA’s budget for the management
of domestic, commercial fisheries.
The individual fishery budgets are divided between licensed fishers on equity
grounds decided by the relevant MAC. Normally, costs are apportioned between
fishers on the basis of their quota or gear unit holdings in the fishery. For example, a
fisher holding 100 ton of tuna quota would pay double the management costs of
someone holding 50 ton of quota.
Cost-recovery policy in Australia is different from the Canadian revenue-gener-
ating exercise briefly described above in at least two important ways. First, the Aus-
tralian model is explicitly based on recovering management costs, as opposed to the
mixed rationale of both rent- and cost-recovery implicitly employed in the Canadian
model. Second, AFMA identifies, in detail, management costs on a fishery-by-fishery
basis. Preliminary management budgets are provided by AFMA to the various fish-
ery management advisory committees (MACs) for scrutiny and advice. In practice,
MAC agreement on the budget is required before levies are collected from fishers.
A Lesson From the Canadian and Australian Approaches:  The Role of
Finance/Treasury Departments
If cost-recovery is to play an important role in increasing transparency and account-
ability in the fisheries management decision making process, it is important that the
policy framework is properly designed. Fisheries management agencies have neither
the expertise, nor more importantly, the vested interest to design such a policy
framework.
The Australian experience, in which the cost-recovery policy framework was
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the Department of Finance, provides evidence to support this view—especially
when compared to the Canadian model. However, finance/treasury agencies must do
more than just set cost-recovery guidelines, it is important that the guidelines are
followed.
The Canadian Treasury Board Secretariat (1994) produced a document entitled,
Cost-recovery and User Fees. This document defines cost-recovery as “Recovery of
expenses in providing a particular good, service, or use of facility;” user fees are
“Charges to identifiable individuals or groups in exchange for some direct benefit;”
and, taxation as a “Mandatory charge to individuals and organizations without refer-
ence to any special benefits conferred.” The Treasury Board document also states
that “Revenue from taxes—as well as net revenues from charges for rights or privi-
leges—should be available for redistribution to Government priorities while cost-re-
covery should be available to offset the cost of delivering the programs in question.”
Finally, the document argues that the basis for charging with respect to cost-recov-
ery, user fees and tax are respectively, “Up to full but cannot exceed full cost,” Mar-
ket Rates or value of the benefits,” and “No Relationship.”
The “access fees” being charged by the Canadian Department of Fisheries and
Oceans (DFO) do not appear to be consistent with Treasury Board guidelines. First,
DFO has ruled out cost-recovery and resource rentals as a basis for its charges,
therefore it is not clear how the DFO charging basis relates to the Treasury Board
document or any other conceptual framework. Second, any particular Canadian fish-
ery that pays access fees above management costs is either paying a user fee (re-
source rentals) or is being taxed, with the revenue being used to cross-subsidize
other DFO activities, as opposed to being directed to the Consolidated Revenue Ac-
count. This would be contrary to Treasury Board guidelines.
Therefore, while we see cost-recovery as a potentially useful fisheries manage-
ment tool, we think it is important that finance/treasury departments play a signifi-
cant “hands on” role in ensuring proper implementation.5
Conclusions
Pearce’s quote in the introduction is as relevant today as it was in 1982. As a general
observation, fisheries management institutions world-wide have failed to conserve
fisheries resources and deliver economic benefits from resource usage. This failure
has come at significant financial cost to taxpayers—both in terms of management
costs and income support payments that often follow a fisheries collapse, as was the
case with northern cod.
In response to such failures, many important changes to fisheries management
practices have been suggested, such as the need to: allocate strong property rights to
fishers; incorporate risk and uncertainty in decision making; better integrate biology,
economic, and management disciplines; increase user group participation; and iden-
tify operational management objectives. However, these changes are likely to be of
marginal benefit if public sector institutions continue to be the delivery mechanism
for management services. Profound institutional change is required.
We would like to conclude with a brief consideration of the following quote
from Hilborn (1992), “Finally, the problems of formal stock assessment and deci-
sion analysis are unimportant unless fishing effort can be controlled. All the most
sophisticated biological, economic and statistical products are wasted if we do not
5 Of course, there is no guarantee that central agencies will necessarily insist on a rational approach to
cost-recovery. However, once even a flawed approach is implemented, pressures from industry and in
turn opposition political parties may help to force the introduction of a more responsible approach.Thalassorama 65
learn how to manage the fishing fleets. This is the true challenge for the future of
fisheries management.”
While agreeing with the thrust of Hilborn’s statement, one important qualifica-
tion is warranted. We see little likelihood that public sector fisheries management
institutions will ever “learn how to manage the fishing fleets.” The true challenge
for the future of fisheries management is to find ways to reduce significantly the
role of public sector institutions, and in turn political imperatives, in the provision
of management services. A properly designed cost-recovery policy is a potentially
useful vehicle to drive this change.
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